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A Conception of a New Act on Insolvency 
 
 
Abstract. The author—being a well-known expert of the field of law of bankruptcy and 
liquidation—gives a critical analysis of the present status of the Hungarian bankruptcy law. 
It is a commonplace to say that this field of the law is in very tight connection with the 
economy. Therefore the changes and the changing trends of the economy may have huge 
influence on the law of liquidation and bankruptcy, as well.  
 As it is known the effective act on bankruptcy, liqudation and voluntary dissolution was 
adopted in 1991 in Hungary. Nevertheless there have been modifications on this act since 
then, the new economic conditions require a more appropriate regulation of this field.  
 The author presents a thorough summary on the critical points of the valid regulation. 
The author applies a comparative method by referring to the legal solutions of different 
European countries concerning this branch of law. The author underlines that there are even 
significant terminological differences between the Hungarian regulation and e.g. the regulation 
of the EU-countries. This circumstance itself would demand modification of the law of 
bankruptcy in Hungary with respect to the join of Hungary to the European Union.  
 The author mentions examples of the everyday practice of bankruptcy and liquidation, 
which can also prove the necessity of creating a new act on this issue. The author puts high 
emphasis on the role and activity of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy). Finally the author 
attempts to outline those essential elements of this branch of law, which should be taken into 
consideration during the codification of the new act on bankruptcy, liquidation and insolvency.  
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I. On the ncessity of ceating a new act  
 
During the process of legal harmonisation, the reconciliation of norms governing 
specific areas of Hungarian law with the legal materials of the European Union 
has become an established practice. This, in a certain cases may imply the 
adoption of a new act, while in other cases, some sort of adjustment is sufficient.  
 Directive no. 1346/2000, which created the international bankruptcy law on 
the level of the European Union was promulgated in Hungary on 15th May, 
2002 and shall be effective law on the accession of Hungary to the EU. By 
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the debtor’s assets scattered on the territory of several EU member states to 
one main procedure, permitting that supplementary procedures on the territory 
of one member state are pursued according to the substantive law of the specific 
country. Therefore, the fundamental amendment of bankruptcy law is not 
necessary since only procedural issues are concerned.  
 As opposed to the above, it is obvious that the common system of procedural 
law shall lead to the advance of the rules of substantive law and it can be 
assumed that substantive bankruptcy law, even if no measures were taken, 
would be adjusted to the norms followed and established by the majority of 
the member states within 4 or 5 years after accession of Hungary to the EU. 
This circumstance, in our point of view, according to our view, evokes the 
reformation of our bankruptcy law, which has been a practical problem since 
the bankruptcy act of 1991 came into effect. 
 It is nearly a cliché that bankruptcy law is a major instrument of the actual 
economic policy, which the legislators actually resorted to as it is marked by 
several minor amendments besides two amendments to supplementary law, 
which are equally designed to ameliorate the respective law. At this moment, we 
cannot endeavour to assess the impact of these amendments, which, has 
already been manifested both in legal practice and in expert literature. In this 
respect we should mention that legal practice even today has to deal with four 
different groups of legal materials, which significantly differ from one another. 
This obviously imposes disproportionate and unnecessary workload on the 
actors and encumbers the completion of the procedures. 
 It is fortunate that Hungarian legal codification has already employed a new 
legislative method (competition act, act on business associations) of framing 
formally new and unified law instead of greater amendments and thereby 
facilitated jurisdiction and made the Hungarian legal system more transparent. 
 The facts outlined above justify our proposal for drafting a new bankruptcy 
law, instead of the mere amendment of the old one. 
 
 
II. Conceptual definitions 
 
As it is widely known, the terminology of our effective law is in compliance 
neither with domestic legal traditions nor international practice. This, in itself 
would not pose a problem since the basic content-ased criterion of the 
applicability of a term is that it should define the respective legal institution 
markedly and distinctly. At the same time, safeguarding that content-ased 
aspect when translating the term into other languages should be observed.    
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 The present phrasing, however, does not meet any of these requirements. In 
1986, the use of the term of “bankruptcy” was impossible for political reasons, 
therefore we assigned the term of liquidation to the law-ecree in a quite 
adverse way. Unfortunately, this terminology following the transition period 
prevailed, hence, the strange situation has occurred that we use such widely 
known notions, which are juxtaposed to our historical traditions with different 
implications, which create a different impression in the non-ungarian reader 
and may result in a greater problem.  
 Let’s illustrate the case above with an example: what we denominate as 
liquidation proceedings is termed bankruptcy proceedings in Austrian law, 
whereas Hungarian bankruptcy proceedings is designated as prejudicial action 
or reorganisation procedure in Austrian terminology, while full settlement is 
designated as liquidation proceedings in the legal terminology of our Western 
neighbours. As a result, the Austrian reader will find something quite different 
from what would be expectable under the term of Konkurs in the German 
translation of a Hungarian text. 
 Therefore it is obvious that the terminology, also on the grounds of the inter-
national directive for bankruptcy law as referred to above, has to be rendered 
approximately the same content.    
 
Our recommendation for terminology is as follows: 
 
In the title of the act we propose the application of the term of insolvency. The 
underlying reason is that the German insolvency act, which came into effect at 
the 1st January, 1999 made a significant impact in the sphere of influence of 
German doctrines, thereby also in Hungary, both on account of its broad scope 
and its extraordinarily thorough, 20-ear-ong preparation period, furthermore, by 
reason of the fact that it was adopted and promulgated already in 1994. We can 
safely state that insolvency law has become an established term in the course 
of the recent 5–6 years. 
 We propose to replace the present term of liquidation proceedings for bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It is undeniable that the German insolvency act referred 
to above does not use this term any longer, while other German-speaking 
countries, i.e., Austria and Switzerland do, and the term of bankruptcy 
proceedings has also integrated into the established legal terminology in other 
countries of the Union. By means of this modification, we could join the sweeping 
majority.  
 We propose however, to maintain the term of full settlement. On the one 
hand, it has become fully established in Hungarian legal terminology, on the 
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other hand, doctrinally, it does not fall under the competence of insolvency 
law. Hence our worries concerning the terms of bankruptcy and liquidation do 
not pertain to the term of full settlement. From a strict doctrinal point of view, 
it should not be included in this act, nevertheless, since we propose radical 
changes in the regulation area of this procedure, it can be retained under the 




III. The objectives of the act 
 
In a significant segment of domestic jurisdiction we grave deficiencies occur 
from the economic point of view. That’s why the new act needs to be relatively 
simple, which has to be matched by expeditiousness, transparency and account-
ability. In a given case, the automatism of procedures also has to be taken into 
consideration.  
 In the present Hungarian economic situation, in our view, the major 
emphasis needs to be put on the priority of creditors’ interests. This, from a 
theoretical point of view, means that it is obvious that bankruptcy law crosscuts 
normal liability relations, which shall be replaced by specific procedural 
rules in the moment of the adjudication of bankruptcy. It is natural in itself, 
therefore, we cannot forget that a special legal relation obtains here, since the 
debtor does not deny that the legal title of debt or the amount are valid, there-
fore, the creditors’ claim is valid and it is merely the debtor’s incapability of 
compliance with his liabilities that underlies the fact of non
−
payment.  
 It is an undeniable fact that upon the considerations of the interest of national 
economy, the legal development of the recent 100
−
150 years has shifted in the 
direction of solutions protecting the debtor, which, understandably, could only 
be accomplished at the damage of creditors. However, the systematic overs-
hadowing of creditors, on the one hand, does not correspond to the fundamental 
principles of the legal system, on the other hand, it may cause disturbances in 
the functioning of the economy under normal liability relations. Economic 
analyses also to support the fact that the new Hungarian act has to be funda-
mentally creditor-friendly, whereas the creditor’s interest needs to be construed 
in a broad scope. This not only implies that the creditor should be capable of 
obtaining the greatest possible share of the demand, but also that the creditor 
could achieve this purpose, it also has to play an active role in the reorgani-
sation of the debtor if possible and necessary. 
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IV. Conceptual modifications 
 
1. The pragmatic analyses positively support the fact that extraordinarily many 
liquidation proceedings are initiated. In several cases, the creditors resort to this 
legal institution only as a psychic threat, and thereby produce unnecessary work-
load for the courts as well as undermine the credit of the legal institution. Hence 
in the future the statutory encumbering of the conditions of the commencement 
of bankruptcy proceedings seems to be expedient. The amendment, which came 
into force as of 1st September, 2001 was framed in this spirit, since, with the 
termination of the right of the prenotation of dues, the commencement of the 
proceedings shall cost 40.000.- HUF in each case. 
 Proceeding with this line of argument, we propose on the one hand, that in 
some cases a mandatory procedure is initiated by the debtor, on the other hand, 
that the limit of the claimed amount for the creditors is prescribed.  
 2. The present effective solution fundamentally undermines the role of 
securities protected with ius in rem, which leads to an imbalance of the economy. 
With respect to the fact that a hinge of our conception is the protection of 
creditors’ interests, we propose the division of the assets of the debtor into two 
parts. The items of property secured under ius in rem for the creditor shall be 
indemnified directly. (Separate right of indemnification.) Supposing the sale of 
the security covers the claim, the creditor status entailing a separate right of 
indemnification shall be terminated and the potential residue shall be added to 
the other segment of bankruptcy assets. In an opposite case, the creditor with 
an unsatisfied claim shall be determined as a normal bankruptcy creditor and 
shall be included in the creditors’ indemnification sequence.  
 3. In a number of cases, due payment of the employees causes a grave 
problem. Even if there is adequate coverage available for that purpose, the 
claims of secured creditors cannot be fully satisfied. In case our recommen-
dations are accepted, the settlement of employees’ lawful claims will be even 
more endangered, since it may well be the case that a more substantial part of 
the debtor’s assets would be fused into funds for separate indemnification. In 
order to secure that both employees get their due emolument and the primacy of 
creditors’ interests is not curbed, we recommend that a monetary fund is set 
up. This monetary fund could be managed by the Hungarian Treasury, and its 
resources would spring from the payment of a certain percentage of the wages 
paid. In the event of the provisional exhaustion of the fund, additional 
resources could be arranged for by means of the provisional redistribution of 
the state budget with the prescription of a refund liability.  
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 Of course, this would further put up the price of labour, whereas, since 
claims with security coverage are essentially guaranteed in the system, what can 
be expected is either a greater tendency for the provision of loans on the part of 
banks or the decrease of credit interest rates. In this later case, the extra costs 
that burden the employer would return.    
 4. According to our effective law, the liquidator shall be designated ex 
officio by the court. The scope of those to be liquidated shall be determined in 
a government decree. The government shall invite tenders for entering the 
liquidators on the rolls. The government decree on liquidators does not require 
special amendments. The method however, by which the liquidators or the 
trustees in bankruptcy are appointed should be definitely changed in the future. 
The courts shall have to consider only one circumstance when appointing the 
liquidators, namely, that the liquidator to be appointed is included in the list 
of those registered to proceed as such. At the moment this list encompasses 
120 or 130 liquidators. 
 According to IM–Directive no. 123/1983 on the rules of judicial procedure, 
the appointment of the liquidator (assets supervisor) shall be administered by a 
computer program in the event of the adjudication of liquidation (bankruptcy 
proceedings). The computer program shall offer a list of liquidators registered 
and operating in the competency area of the court for appointment with special 
respect to the order of importance as specified in the liquidation registry and the 
work pressure on the respective liquidator.  
 The directive on the rules of judicial procedure raises several problems 
concerning the appointment of the liquidators, since the referred code of 
practice pertains to the liquidator registered in the competency area of the 
court, which as a legal term is not positive or distinct under any circum-
stances. According to the referred government decree, any liquidator included 
in the supplement may be appointed by any court in Hungary, therefore, such 
a nomenclature as liquidators registered in specific areas of competence does 
not prevail in any statute. Such statutory authorisation does not exist.  
 In practice, what happens is that the courts in charge of liquidation shall 
register 10 or 30 companies arbitrarily out of more than 100 liquidators in the 
competency area of the court and further liquidators shall not be concerned in 
the course of the proceedings. A number of methods are available for the 
appointment of liquidators at courts. One of these is the so-called automatism, 
which in practice means that the liquidators shall be appointed in a specific 
order but in a contingent manner. In this case, the experience and the expertise 
of the liquidator shall not be taken into consideration. As a consequence of such 
automatic appointment, the factors of expert knowledge, the work pressure and 
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the potential special professional skills of the liquidators shall be disregarded, 
since the computer system appoints the liquidators on a schematic and linear 
basis. In this framework, we can’t assume that the court or the liquidating 
judge, after due consideration of all circumstances of a specific case, shall 
appoint the liquidator with the greatest expertise and professional skills.   
 Another option is that the court, considering all circumstances of the 
case, including the particular circumstances of the business association and 
the preparedness of the liquidator, endeavours to appoint the most adequate 
liquidator in the given case. Unfortunately, this system also has its disadvan-
tages, so far as we tend to encounter the ungrounded charges that the courts 
give preference to certain liquidators in the liquidation proceedings.  
 Therefore, on the appointment of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy), 
even the appearance that the court in the course of the appointment procedure 
would favour certain liquidators (trustees in bankruptcy) should be avoided, 
hence, in the future, instead of the application of the automatic system or the 
systematic appointment by the court, a new and adequate system should be 
developed in all respects.   
 In practice, the option that the debtor requests the appointment of a specific 
liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) that it deems as favourable has also occurred. 
This fact, however, does not seem a proper solution, since in some cases the 
debtor is interested in the withdrawal of further stakes from the residue of the 
assets. So far as the debtor recommends and decides on the entity of the trustee 
in bankruptcy, we might face the threat that the debtor and the trustee in 
bankruptcy appear to collaborate in the procedure.  
 In our viewpoint, the following pattern of the appointment of the trustee in 
bankruptcy would be the most adequate and objective solution.  
 With respect to the confidentiality of the matter, either the creditor or the 
creditors’ board should be put in charge of the appointment of the trustee in 
bankruptcy, implying that the trustee in bankruptcy would be appointed by the 
creditor or the creditors’ board and the only agency of the court in its ruling that 
affirms the case of insolvency would be to appoint the entities of the trustees in 
bankruptcy as designated by the creditor or the board.  
 We also mention as a viable option that the creditor or the board could 
make a recommendation for the entity of the trustee in bankruptcy with the 
consent or the approval of the National Association of Liquidators. 
 So far as this construction seems reasonable, the potential ways of the 
implementation of the recall of the liquidator in the course of the procedure 
also need to be considered. According to the present regulation, the liquidator 
cannot be recalled unless the procedure has finished.  
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 In case the legislator’s intention in the course of the potential amendment 
of the statute is to allow for a broader scope for the creditors’ board, a decision 
needs to be reached whether to facilitate for the creditors or the creditors’ 
board to recall the liquidator under definite and strict conditions, in case the 
reasons as specified in the act obtain.  
 5. In our viewpoint the most neuralgic points or terms of the present 
liquidation proceedings are the following: the determination of the insolvency 
of the debtor by the court, the appointment of the liquidator and subsequently, 
the appeal for a review of the ruling of the court by the debtor. The sweeping 
majority of appeals for review, according to some surveys a rate of up to 90 p.c., 
are formal. By filing such an appeal, the debtor’s intention is to gain time and 
within this time, with special respect to the exceptions, the debtor will make an 
attempt to withdraw the remaining assets of the association. Such procedures 
seriously violate the creditors’ interests and the jurisdiction is unable to handle 
this problem according to the present practice.  
 The analysis of cases appealed so demonstrates that on an average it takes 
one or one and a half years for the Supreme Court to reach a firm decision, which, 
in practice means that a crucial majority, i.e., 90 per cent of the appealed rulings 
shall be affirmed. Whereas, in that term of one or one and a half years or in an 
even longer period the unscrupulous proprietors or the officials of the debtor’s 
association may incur grave damages to the creditors, who stand by helplessly.  
 As we see it the emergence of this adverse situation may be prevented by 
the introduction of a single new institution of law, i.e., the designation of a 
provisional guardian ad litem ex officio by the court immediately after liquidation 
proceedings have commenced.    
 The task of the provisional guardian ad litem, without aiming at 
completeness in its agency, would be the protection of the creditors’ interests 
and monitoring the economic activities of the debtor until the court appoints the 
ultimate trustee in bankruptcy on the basis of the creditors’ request. The task of 
the provisional guardian ad litem would be to survey the debtor’s assets, which 
implies an overall inspection of the debtor’s financial situation, including the 
inspection of bookkeeping and of the cashier’s book, as well as of the 
securities and the goods stock, contracts and bank accounts. The provisional 
guardian ad litem could request information from the leading officials of the 
business association, about which the creditors and the creditors’ board shall 
be continuously provided information.    
 In our assumption, it is reasonable that the provisional guardian ad litem 
affirms the pecuniary covenants of the debtor that emerge after the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings.  
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 The debtor would actually not suffer damages by reason of the appointment 
of the provisional guardian ad litem and consequently, would not be more 
disadvantaged. So far as the bankruptcy proceedings are instituted by the 
debtor or the Court of Registration, the limitation of the rights of the debtor as 
outlined above would obviously not be hindered. So far as it is the creditor 
that initiates the bankruptcy proceedings, the theoretical possibility arises 
that it is exactly the market rival, which initiates the proceedings against the 
debtor so as to incur an awkward market situation, since the provisional guardian 
ad litem necessarily impedes the operation of been determined as insolvent, the 
creditor, who initiated the bankruptcy the debtor. In that case, our recommen-
dation is that if the bankruptcy proceedings were not instituted by the court, 
since the debtor has not proceedings, shall be obligated to indemnify the debtor. 
The provisional guardian ad litem would by all means proceed with its activity 
until the appointment of the ultimate trustee in bankruptcy, and thereby, the 
unjustified marking time and the appeals that are designated to play for time 
would be eliminated.    
 6. The present regulation of the activity of the creditors’ board can’t 
secure that the objective the legislator intends to attain is accomplished. In the 
majority of cases, the creditors’ boards are not operative or they are not estab-
lished, while in other cases the established boards are designated to implement 
merely formal tasks. According to our standpoint, the establishment of the 
boards in the future should be mandatory under the new regulation. So far as 
the number of creditors does not reach the minimum limit of three, each 
creditor shall automatically become a member of the creditors’ board. In our 
view, the trustee in bankruptcy should be appointed by the creditors’ board or 
the creditors under specific conditions, but the dismissal of the trustee in 
bankruptcy should also be permissible. The role of the creditors’ board in the 
procedure should be definitely reinforced. Hence, the introduction of the Anglo-
axon practice would be reasonable, according to which, it is the creditors’ board 
that assigns the task of the sale of the assets to the creditors. In that case, the 
role of the trustee in bankruptcy would be restricted to an assessment, adequate 
sequencing and categorisation of the creditors’ claims. So far as the re-
organisation of the debtor is deemed necessary, the trustee in bankruptcy shall 
ensure that the tasks the reorganisation entails are fully complied with and the 
collection of outstanding debts is accomplished. All functions however, related 
to the sale of assets would be transferred to the powers of the creditors or the 
creditors’ board. Of course, it is not impeded legally that the creditors’ board 
instructs the liquidator or any other party to sell the assets. Our proposed 
solution, in our conviction, would facilitate that the procedures related to the 
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sale of the assets become more simple, expeditious and efficient. Thereby, 
the rumours and assumptions implying that liquidators tend to spin out the 
procedures or obtain undesirable financial advantage would be refutable. 
Hence the inadequate practice, which the liquidators resort to almost without 
exception could also be ended, namely, that the majority of liquidators 
systematically makes use of the debtor’s physical assets, primarily, the vehicles 
under liquidation without financial compensation, and thereby, causes 
considerable damage to the creditors. By the regulation, the creditors or the 
creditors’ board should be granted substantially more entitlements in the course 
of the entire procedure, while the liquidator (or the trustee in bankruptcy) 
would be perpetually obligated to report to the creditors on the specific stages 
of the bankruptcy proceedings according to a certain scheme.  
 7. In our present practice, several problems arise from the fact that the 
debtor’s assets prove to be so insufficient after the commencement of the liqui-
dation proceedings that they shall not even cover the costs of the procedure. 
This means, that thereby we impose not only superfluous workload on the 
courts, but also incur groundless or non
−
or slowly remunerative, basically 
unnecessary costs for the liquidators. Therefore, we propose that the well-
known solution as pursuant to Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
Liquidation Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution is employed, which, in the 
light of contemporary practice, has proved suitable, namely, that the 
insufficiency or deficiency of assets should be determined as an impeding 
factor of the commencement of the procedure. In that case, we would save the 
actors from doing ... a lot of superfluous work, whereas, the possibility, that 
the debtor withdraws the assets in the last minute, can be impeded by the 
establishment of the institution of the provisional guardian ad litem. 
 8. As it is known, the definition of pledge as specified under Article 266 
of the Civil Code was re-codified under Act CXXXVII of 2000, which intro-
duced a new concept of pledge on real property. The core of that legal 
institution is defined as follows: “The creation of a pledge on real property is 
permissible on the entire assets or part of the assets (operated as a self-
contained economic unit without the determination of its constituents, rights 
and liabilities, i.e., real property) of a legal entity or a business association 
without a legal entity via a pledge contract, which shall be documented in front 
of a notary public and this pledge shall be recorded in the pledge property 
register. The pledge on real property, after the conclusion of the pledge contract, 
shall pertain to the real property that shall be included in the obligee’s assets 
when the obligee obtains the concerning right of disposal, however, shall be 
terminated when the real property is removed from the obligee’s assets.”  
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 In the event of the introduction of a separate indemnification law, it is 
logical that the creditor who holds a pledge on real property stands basically 
alone, since it shall seize hold of the assets obtainable until the claim is 
satisfied. So far as the bankruptcy proceedings are commenced by one creditor, 
the procedural rules modelled primarily on several creditors would lose 
their relevance. Therefore, we propose that in such a case no bankruptcy 
proceedings are instituted, but only and exclusively a reorganisation procedure 
according to the decision of the creditor. Whereas, the creditor can be expected 
to take additional care to monitor the activity of the debtor, which can possibly 
entail a financial benefit consisting in the accomplishment of the financial 
reorganisation and consolidation of the company. In that case, of course, the 
facilitation of the creditor’s actual influence on the debtor’s usual economic 
activities must be reinforced, possibly in other cases of reorganisation, too.  
 In that case, the ranking of the creditor in the indemnification sequence also 
has to be addressed. If the obligee of the lien on real property is preceded by 
one or several creditors in the sequence, they can’t be disadvantaged, so the 
obligee of the pledge on real property shall be obligated to ensure that the 
indemnification of the creditors preceding in the sequence is accomplished. 
This is implemented by redemption from the assets of the debtor in the 
reorganisation procedure, but we think that it is also doctrinally feasible that 
the obligee of the pledge on real property reaches an agreement with the 
creditors preceding in the sequence via the instruments of civil law. 
 9. As already mentioned under the point above, bying to our view, 
granting more management entitlements in the reorganisation procedure to the 
creditor would be expedient. In this respect, we may choose between two 
conceptual options, i.e., on the one hand, the contemporary system, which 
works based on the joint management by the debtor and the asset supervisor, 
on the other hand, the creditors become entitled to appoint the reorganisation-
trustee, who shall be responsible for the implementation or effecting the 
implementation of the reorganisation. 
 10. The provisions of Act IV of 1997 on Business Associations have 
principally transgressed the institution of limited liability with respect to 
bankruptcy cases. Whereas, in case of associations with legal entities, it was 
not only the factor of inflation that evoked the determination of higher nominal 
capital and authorised capital, but also the more powerful enforcement of the 
protection of creditors. On that basis, as far as bankruptcy proceedings are 
concerned, in our view, when the nominal capital or the authorised capital are 
not actually available and the company shall not initiate proceedings against 
itself, its limited liability should be terminated. 
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 11. With respect to full settlement, it can be definitely asserted that at the 
moment the proceedings are unnecessarily complicated, so that the proprietors 
of an association with minor capital shall be advised to reconsider their 
concerning decision. Contrary to the established legal regulation and Hungarian 
jurisdiction, we can state that on the one hand, full settlement in the European 
Union member states does not fall under the competence of bankruptcy law, 
which is doctrinally justifiable, on the other hand, it is essentially covered 
under financial and company law and shall be handled accordingly without a 
special procedure. As for our view, the adoption of that practice is by all 
means reasonable. Therefore, in our draft the regulations of substantive law 
concerning the decision on full settlement would be sustained, whereas both 
the practice of the appointment of the trustee in full settlement and the 
mandatorily prescribed order of procedures would be terminated. Accordingly, 
the decision on full settlement shall be announced to the Registry Court by the 
management, which shall request its publication in the Company Gazette. 
Subsequently, the daily balance sheet and the recommendation for the division 
of assets shall be prepared within the term as defined by the proprietors 
without any formal procedures, which shall be filed to the Registry Court by 
the management in line with a request for the liquidation of the company. As a 
result, the entitlements for full settlement would be terminated, which are 
subject to our effective law. This standpoint is tenable since full settlement is 
a sovereign proprietor’s decision in itself, which does not concern the public. 
On that basis however it can be concluded that an intervention into normal 
liability relations with the instruments of law cannot be substantiated. To shed 
light on the issue from another viewpoint, that implies that full settlement 
in the future can only and exclusively be realised if, on the one hand, the case 
of insolvency or its threat does not obtain, or on the other hand, the company 
can settle all its liabilities deriving from contract law with the instruments of 
civil law.  
 Of course, it cannot be excluded either, that such a claim arises, which the 
company managers have not been aware of in spite of their greatest care. These 
extreme cases also have to be taken into consideration. Therefore, in our 
recommendation, the proprietors of the company cancelled under the legal title 
of full settlement shall bear one year’s liability for such claims, which have an 
effect on the distributed assets for one year after cancellation. This, however, 
is a forfeiting deadline. In an opposite case, the principle of the security of 
circulation would be damaged.  
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V. The structure of the law 
 
The objectives that the legislator sets have to be framed in the introduction 
of all significant codes, i.e., in the preamble. In this respect, we propose the 
extension of the preamble with a definition of the basic principles to be 
followed in both procedures, according to their substance, content and 
objectives, with reference to the fact what attitude the parties are obligated to 
demonstrate in the course of the procedures. The relevance of this extended 
preamble would be that both procedures allow for grave financial abuse and 
even the strictest legal regulations cannot offer protection against these. There-
fore, it is uncertain if the general notions of the Civil Code are satisfactory in 
terms of the notion of liability, since it is obvious that in these cases the parties 
have to comply with the norm of increased care.   
 
1. The definition of the concept and norms of substantive law  
 
Similarly to our effective law, the new act initially provides a definition of the 
concept or basically, the norms of substantive law. 
 
a) The effect of the act 
With respect to the effect, a recurrent pragmatic problem is that, on the one 
hand, bankruptcy law uses the terminus technicus of economic organisations, on 
the other hand, it separately enumerates the entities that qualify as economic 
organisations. This, in case of all formations that the lawmaker intends to include 
under the effect of the law, entails that a direct amendment of the act is 
necessary. With respect to the circumstance that it already crystallised in the 
course of the codification of the Civil Code that the term of economic organi-
sation was deemed to be exiled from Hungarian law, we propose that this notion 
was revoked under the act of insolvency. As a consequence of which, since 
bankruptcy law regulates business activities, we could apply the definition 
below: the effect of the law pertains to legal and non
−
legal entities engaged in 
business activities. One can highlight, this notional definition seems to be 
adequate to include all those associations under the effect of the law, which are 
engaged in business activities only as a supplementary activity. Primarily societies 
and foundations need to be mentioned. The administration of the bankruptcy 
situation of these associations poses a recurrent problem for Hungarian law-
making, however, the acceptance of our draft could solve this problem. Of course, 
adequate amendments shall be necessary in the relevant statutes, and a res-
ponsibility regulation has to be integrated in the Civil Code, which prescribes 
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the full and unlimited liability of those legal entities that have been in the 
position to make decisions in those foundations and societies, in which as a 
consequence of its business activity, a bankruptcy situation occurred. The term 
of “business activity” has to be rendered an economic content as an auxiliary rule. 
 
b) Debtor 
The debtor as a term with all its legal implications is applicable in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings or the reorganisation procedure. Therefore, the uphold of 
the contemporary effective regulation also seems adequate, according to which 
the debtor is the entity that was not able to, or presumably will not be able to 
settle its debt (debts) on the due date.  
 
c) Creditor 
The creditor is the party, who has money or property claims expressed in 
monetary terms against the debtor and has been registered so by the liquidator 
in the bankruptcy proceedings.  
 The creditor, who has security protected with ius in rem against the debtor, 
is entitled to separate indemnification. 
 
d) Assets 
All property that the debtor’s proprietary rights obtain for as pursuant to the 
Civil Code. Both the right of lease, which is effective for more than ten years 
or an indefinite term and the usage rights attached to a particular item of 
property are applicable under the definition. 
 
e) The Bankrupt’s estate  
The bankrupt’s estate is that part of the debtor’s assets, which is not burdened 
with securities protected with ius in rem. 
 
2. Bankruptcy  proceedings 
 
a) The commencement of the proceedings 
In accordance with our effective law, the proceedings can be commenced upon 
the initiation of the debtors or the creditors. The difference however,  consists 
in when and on what conditions this is conceivable.  
 We recommend that the debtor is obliged to commence the proceedings if it 
is a legal entity, and if, on an average of the previous financial year, the 
nominal or the authorised capital was not at the debtor’s disposal, or if the 
debtor’s public liabilities approximate the amount of the debtor’s capital. In 
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that case the basis of reference versus the APEH (Hungarian Financial and Tax 
Administration Authorities) would be the balance of the annual current 
account including those “hiding” nominal liabilities not shown on the current 
account balance of the APEH (Hungarian Financial and Tax Administration 
Authorities). Furthermore, those cases can be also applied, when the given 
firm has not settled the payment of the due general sales tax or the personal 
income tax. The non-payment of the personal income tax by the debtor’s 
association could also be considered as a case subject to criminal law, since 
under private law, the amount of the personal income tax is a legal due of the 
employee, i.e., a third party, and its non
−
payment on the part of the company 
can be considered as fraud. 
 The debtor can apply the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings in 
a case when, according to its discretion, it shall presumably not be able to meet 
its foreseen liabilities. The creditor is entitled to commence the proceedings, 
if the due claim expired and the conditions of the debtor’s insolvency obtain 
and the amount of the claim reaches ... HUF. 
 
b) Insolvency 
Classical bankruptcy law in this respect provides significant scope for judicial 
discretion, since the initial supposition was that such economic-tructural 
problems underline the fact of pecuniary non-ayment, which cannot be remedied. 
At the same time, it was publicly known that bankruptcy proceedings implied a 
basically drastic intervention into economy and it was a long and expensive 
process, therefore, its avoidance was by all means expedient and reasonable. 
It would be very easy to assume that a return to this principle would be 
favourable and the judges should be granted discretionary powers. This, how-
ever, by reason of the current workload on the courts, would obviously not be 
an advantageous decision. Whereas, the three currently regulated cases in bank-
ruptcy law seem to adequately and relatively normatively secure the reassuring 
solution of the case, as this is justified by practice. Therefore, we recommend 




v) framework of conditions as pursuant to Para. 2 of 
Article 27 of Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation 
Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution with the relevant amendment of 
terminology that the debtor did not comply with the agreement as framed in 
the reorganisation procedure.  
 
c) The proceedings of the provisional guardian ad litem  
The immediate appointment allows that the provisional guardian ad litem offers 
a general insight into the financial situation of the debtor before its office 
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expires. In this respect, it shall make a declaration if the transactions within a 
year preceding the commencement of the proceedings can be challenged and 
in the event of their challenge what rate of return can be expected. So far as 
the provisional guardian ad litem is capable of implementing this activity 
efficiently, upon the appointment the ultimate liquidator, the proceedings can 
enter into a more active phase, since the ultimate trustee in bankruptcy shall start 
the activity in possession of such preliminary information, the determination of 
which has to be devoted more time.  
 
d) The activity of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) 
In compliance with classical law and contemporary international legal practice, 
the trustee in bankruptcy receives direct entitlement to manage and dispose of 
the bankrupt’s estate or the creditor is entitled to separate indemnification. On 
the one hand, the trustee in bankruptcy controls the actual property that was 
sold, therefore, shall be entitled to challenge and stop the process.  
 One neuralgic point of our present act is that neither the creditors, nor the 
proprietors of the debtor’s association are supplied with continuous information 
on the present status of the liquidation, since the liquidator is obligated to do 
this on request. We think that in the future a system of the provision of 
constant information should be established as a consequence of which both the 
creditors and the creditors’ board, and the proprietors can receive meritorious 
information on the actual financial situation. Therefore, the prescription of a 
15-day-deadline is expedient. 
 The registration of the creditors’ claims would follow the present system so 
far as the liability of the creditors to pay registration fees would be sustained. 
Although this solution can be strongly debated doctrinally, we still propose its 
sustenance, since there are no other liquid resources available, from which the 
activity of the liquidator could be remunerated. Whereas, it is a basic market 
principle that any economic activity is due its equivalent. 
 This is the period, when it is actually decided whether the liquidation 
proceedings continue or do not, since the ultimate liquidator has been appointed, 
the financial situation has been clarified, the scope of the creditors securing 
substantive additional obligation has been shaped. Disregarding the activity of 
the liquidator, we propose that the act stipulates that the creditors’ board shall 
be summoned within 30 days of the commencement of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, which later will have a major role.  
 According to one view, the creditors’ board should include the creditors 
with the three most outstanding claims, while in another view this circle should 
also involve the representative of the financial institution that keeps the account 
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of the debtor. The creditors’ board, after it has been set up on a mandatory 
basis, would supervise the activity of the liquidator. The liquidator would be 
obliged to provide information to the creditors’ board on the continuation or 
cessation of sub-ransactions and on the actual sale of assets, and would be 
permitted to administer any asset flow, which equals or exceeds 10 per cent 
of the bankrupt’s estate, exclusively if the consent of the creditors’ board has 
been guaranteed. Of course, the scope of the competence of the creditors’ 
board also encompasses the supervision of the economic activity of those 
creditors entitled to separate indemnification.  
 So far as the creditors’ board is unsatisfied with the activity of the liquidator, 
the creditors would be entitled to replace him, but the normative conditions for 
that measure shall have to be set forth. This implies that it has to be outlined in 
what cases and after what warning the board shall be entitled to resort to this 
measure. The replaced liquidator would be entitled to the equivalent of its 
activity, except when the creditors’ board can prove that the liquidator did not 
proceed according to the requirement of increased care and breached that. 
After the closure of its economic procedures, the liquidator shall prepare a 
general balance sheet and a recommendation for the division of assets. Until 
that time the creditors’ board can initiate the conclusion of the bankruptcy 
agreement with the purpose that the completion of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
that is, the actual liquidation of the debtor can be avoided. As for the present 
situation, at that point the creditors’ board on behalf of the creditors is entitled 
to negotiate with the debtor’s representative. In that case however, it is 
advisable, whereas this is contrary to the present practice, to consult the 
experts of the liquidator, since that is the legal entity that managed the debtor’s 
association up to that date. 
 A classical task of the bankrupt’s trustee is the classification of the creditors 
of the estate. In our framework, the method of classification would undergo 
significant changes, therefore, it deserves explanation in a separate sub-section. 
So far as the court accepts the general balance sheet or the recommendation for 
the division of assets, the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) shall be absolved 
from responsibility, and it shall provide for its due payment. 
 
e) Indemnification sequence 
In our framework, the indemnification sequence would undergo basic changes, 
since secured creditors’ claims have been transferred to a different branch of 
indemnification, therefore, they do not burden the estate any longer. With 
respect to this factor, and on the grounds of the sustenance of basic principles of 
bankruptcy law, i.e., no creditors shall receive indemnification unless full satis-
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faction of the creditors ranked as preceding in the sequence have been fully 
indemnified, our proposed indemnification sequence can be outlined as follows: 
 1. Cost: this category includes all costs of the judicial procedure and the 
overall fees of the liquidator, 
 2. Mass liabilities: a continuous and well-established institution of bank-
ruptcy law. All payments, practically without a legal title, are covered by this 
term, which have arisen on the grounds of the provision of the trustee of 
bankruptcy, in which the mass was involved either in the position of the 
obligee or of the obligor. Since it is easy to understand that in a given case the 
suppliers are exclusively willing to make external tools, which are necessary 
for the completion of semi-manufactures, available on condition that they are 
paid the equivalent and do not become the bankrupt’s creditors. As a result of 
this category, these payments shall be made in the course of the proceeding, 
therefore, these payments shall already be settled in the moment of the judicial 
proceedings. 
 3. Claims made upon the warranty or guarantee: according to contemporary 
notions these are claims, which arise from the non-economic activities of the 
individual person. Classically, we distinguish between two categories, which are 
obviously applicable with respect to debtors engaged in such activities, whereas, 
the classification of the obligees into the creditors’ first group seems expedient 
by reason of the relevance of the interest to be protected. In this case, which 
special regard to the type of payments, the liquidator shall determine a separate 
amount, which shall presumably cover these liabilities until the expiration of 
warranty. So far as the separated fund is not exhausted, the indemnification basis 
of other creditors shall be extended.  
 4. A share of public liabilities calculated with capital—and transaction 
interest: as it is known, in terms of public liabilities, several types of fines or 
interest surcharges may be charged. It however is not unusual that the obligors 
because of the contingent discrepancies of data—flow only subsequently receive 
the concerning information. It would be contrary to the objective of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings that other creditors bear the costs of the extraordinarily great 
interest surcharges and fines that have to be paid on certain outstandingly 
enormous public liabilities, which sometimes exceed the total of the capital 
claim itself. Therefore, the mere calculation of the normal transaction interest 
seems logical in the event of indemnification of the creditor on a privileged 
ranking.  
 5. The capital claim calculated with normal transaction interest of the 
creditors qualifying as small or micro-ventures: The subsidising of small and 
micro-ventures is an objective of economic policy, which is relevantly 
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manifested as pursuant to Act XCV of 1999 on small and medium-size enter-
prises and on the subsidy of their development adopted in this scope. This act 
provides a brilliant notional definition of small and micro-ventures, according 
to which a venture, in which the total of employees does not reach 50 and the 
annual net revenue does not exceed HUF 700 million, or the balance-sheet 
total does not exceed HUF 500 million and the stake held by the state and 
the self-government jointly or separately does not exceed a rate of 25% in the 
proprietors’ group, shall qualify as a small venture. A micro-venture is a 
venture, which employs less than 10 employees and the annual net revenue or 
the balance sheet total does not reach the upper limit as specified for small 
ventures.   
 6. Other capital claims. 
 7. Interest fines and bonuses.  
 Obviously, the overall calculation of the transaction interest may be 
accomplished before the proceedings are commenced. 
 
f) The court, after the acceptance of the general balance sheet and a recom-
mendation for the division of the assets, as we already noted, shall recall the 
liquidator and transfer the power to manage the existing assets to the creditors’ 
board. Subsequently, the creditors’ board shall be entitled to sell the assets on 
the market and since it is basically and definitely interested in obtaining the 
highest possible price for the assets, the present complicated regulation of the 
sale of the assets is deemed necessary. 
 
g) The regulation of the bankruptcy proceedings as outlined above entails the 
overall reconsideration of the charge of liquidation and liquidation costs. With 
respect to the fact that it is not the liquidator that shall sell the assets at the 
closure of the proceedings, the basis for the calculation of the charge won’t 
equal the amount of the sold assets. We think, however, that the level of the 
consultation market price as developed recently adequately facilitates the 
determination of the real price by the court, in the course of which it shall take 
the opinion of the creditors’ board into consideration. The principle of the 
formation of the charge as well as the itemised enumeration of the type of 
costs that can be utilised by the liquidator needs to be established in a decree 
issued by the Ministry of Finance, since in that case the legislator could take 
into consideration the price changes in Hungary more effectively than today. 
Of course, as a basic principle we have to assert that the activity of liquidation 
is a business venture like any other venture, therefore, a decent profit needs to 
be secured for that specific activity. 
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3. The reorganisation procedure 
 
The commencement of the procedure may be requested without limitation by the 
debtor or the creditor, who holds a pledge on real property on the debtor’s assets 
under Article 266 of the Civil Code and any other creditor, the worth of whose 
assets secured under right in rem equals half of the property the debtor disposes of.  
 The procedure shall be commenced by registration at the court. The court 
may only investigate the personal particulars, and if the procedure is instituted 
by the creditor, it may examine the legitimacy of the claim, and consequently, 
provide for the commencement of the reorganisation procedure in its ruling. 
This also entails that the debtor shall be entitled to three months’ moratorium 
on payment, in the course of which the claims put forward shall bear normal 
“transaction” rates without late payment surcharges and fines. If the procedure 
was instituted by the debtor, it shall be obligated to recommend a binding 
reorganisation program within two months of the institution of the proceedings, 
to which it should request the consent of the creditor in the course of the 
conciliation. As an alternative to securing a valid approval, reverting to the 
solution effective between the period of 1991
−
1993 is conceivable, when the 
consent of all the creditors present was necessary for the adoption of the 
reorganisation scheme, or the solution of a legal settlement technique, which 
has been basically non-operative since 1993, could also be followed.  
 So far as the creditors initiated the bankruptcy proceedings, it is subject 
to their decision whether they appoint a reorganisation-trustee with full 
competence to manage the debtor’s association.   
 In case an agreement is concluded, the debtor shall be obligated to proceed 
in full compliance with the reorganisation agreement and any essential deviation 
from the scheme (what qualifies as essential deviation shall be determined in 
the agreement) would entail the entitlement to an automatic commencement of 
the bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the debtor is sufficiently encouraged to 
implement the scheme developed or approved of jointly with the creditors. The 
accomplishment of the scheme can take a maximum period of 3 years and after 
the expiration of the period, the court must stay the procedure or proceed with 
it in the scope of bankruptcy proceedings. 
 So far as no agreement is reached and otherwise the conditions of insolvency 
obtain, the reorganisation procedure should be remitted to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, which is not necessary in every case, since the commencement of 
the reorganisation procedure, according to special literature in economics, is 
advisable in case insolvency is merely a remote threat. Therefore, it may well be 
likely that the debtor is still solvent in the moment of an unfruitful agreement. 
